Article dated Sunday, August 08, 2010
BAGHDAD: Five months after an election meant to set it on a course away from sectarian war and towards stability, Iraqis are no closer to knowing who their next prime minister will be.
In an interview with Reuters on Friday, the incumbent prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, said he wants to keep his job and challenged other leading politicians to find a better candidate.
Lawmakers called off two scheduled sessions of parliament in July because there was no agreement on the top political posts.
On Aug. 1, Maliki’s Shia ally, the Iraqi National Alliance, said it was rejecting Maliki as prime minister and halting coalition talks until his bloc, State of Law, nominated another candidate.
Mutual suspicions among the blocs run deep and the hurdles to a final deal remain formidable. The odds are probably still no better than even on Maliki keeping his job. His State of Law coalition came second with 89 seats in the election to 91 won by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya, while the Shia-led Iraqi National Alliance (INA) won around 70 seats.
The following are some scenarios as Iraqis grapple to come to terms with their tenuous democracy 7-1/2 years after the US-led invasion.
At first, it seemed inevitable a Shia mega merger between State of Law and the Iran-friendly INA would sideline the actual vote leader, the Sunni-backed Iraqiya.
But now INA — its main player, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI), whittled down to a rump of its former influence among majority Shias by Maliki’s growing stature — has now resolutely opposed his demand for a second term.
Fiery anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose followers have fumed at Maliki since he sent the Iraqi army to crush their Mehdi Army militia in 2008, has also declined to back him.
Some politicians had suggested Sadr might withdraw his veto of Maliki if the PM agreed to terms such as the release of detained Sadrists, lifting death sentences and a generous sprinkling of cabinet posts.
But the idea was dropped because some of the demands are not within Maliki’s power to grant. He cannot, for example, lift death sentences imposed by courts.
At the end of the day, few expect the Shia majority to sacrifice their unity for personal ambition or over political differences. The power Shias gained after the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein is simply too precious.
Shia Iran, which exerts considerable influence over many Iraqi Shia leaders after housing them for years when they were exiled under Saddam, is also pushing for a united front.
While Tehran might have misgivings about Maliki, Iranian leaders no doubt prefer him to Allawi, viewed as a secular strongman by his supporters and by Iran as a Shia front man for Sunni adherents of Saddam’s now outlawed Baath party.
State of Law has agreed to rein in the powers of the prime minister should Maliki be reappointed, a key demand of his foes.
But Maliki’s unwillingness to weaken the PM’s powers remains a key obstacle in the internal battle among Shias.
INA’s insistence that State of Law present an alternative candidate is coupled with a warning that it might strike a deal with Allawi. But Maliki also says he is in talks with Allawi’s Iraqiya.
The trouble for Maliki’s Dawa party allies is that he is the politician who won the most votes in the March 7 election, and most Dawa lawmakers owe their parliamentary seats to his popularity. It would be embarrassing to betray him.
Yet, as time drags on, some Dawa insiders have begun to hint that their party’s fate has to take precedence over Maliki’s.
The alternative candidates mentioned are close confidants:
Ali al-Adeeb: The most senior of the Dawa alternatives, Adeeb does not owe his seat to Maliki, but his credentials are tainted by a widespread belief that he has Iranian nationality.
Haider al-Abadi: a senior Dawa member, Abadi is an urbane politician with broad respect but owes his seat to Maliki.
Hussain al-Shahristani: Oil Minister Shahristani is a former Dawa party member. His chances are limited because he is viewed as a technocrat and not a political leader.
BAGHDAD: Five months after an election meant to set it on a course away from sectarian war and towards stability, Iraqis are no closer to knowing who their next prime minister will be.
In an interview with Reuters on Friday, the incumbent prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, said he wants to keep his job and challenged other leading politicians to find a better candidate.
Lawmakers called off two scheduled sessions of parliament in July because there was no agreement on the top political posts.
On Aug. 1, Maliki’s Shia ally, the Iraqi National Alliance, said it was rejecting Maliki as prime minister and halting coalition talks until his bloc, State of Law, nominated another candidate.
Mutual suspicions among the blocs run deep and the hurdles to a final deal remain formidable. The odds are probably still no better than even on Maliki keeping his job. His State of Law coalition came second with 89 seats in the election to 91 won by former Prime Minister Iyad Allawi’s Iraqiya, while the Shia-led Iraqi National Alliance (INA) won around 70 seats.
The following are some scenarios as Iraqis grapple to come to terms with their tenuous democracy 7-1/2 years after the US-led invasion.
At first, it seemed inevitable a Shia mega merger between State of Law and the Iran-friendly INA would sideline the actual vote leader, the Sunni-backed Iraqiya.
But now INA — its main player, the Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (ISCI), whittled down to a rump of its former influence among majority Shias by Maliki’s growing stature — has now resolutely opposed his demand for a second term.
Fiery anti-American cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, whose followers have fumed at Maliki since he sent the Iraqi army to crush their Mehdi Army militia in 2008, has also declined to back him.
Some politicians had suggested Sadr might withdraw his veto of Maliki if the PM agreed to terms such as the release of detained Sadrists, lifting death sentences and a generous sprinkling of cabinet posts.
But the idea was dropped because some of the demands are not within Maliki’s power to grant. He cannot, for example, lift death sentences imposed by courts.
At the end of the day, few expect the Shia majority to sacrifice their unity for personal ambition or over political differences. The power Shias gained after the fall of dictator Saddam Hussein is simply too precious.
Shia Iran, which exerts considerable influence over many Iraqi Shia leaders after housing them for years when they were exiled under Saddam, is also pushing for a united front.
While Tehran might have misgivings about Maliki, Iranian leaders no doubt prefer him to Allawi, viewed as a secular strongman by his supporters and by Iran as a Shia front man for Sunni adherents of Saddam’s now outlawed Baath party.
State of Law has agreed to rein in the powers of the prime minister should Maliki be reappointed, a key demand of his foes.
But Maliki’s unwillingness to weaken the PM’s powers remains a key obstacle in the internal battle among Shias.
INA’s insistence that State of Law present an alternative candidate is coupled with a warning that it might strike a deal with Allawi. But Maliki also says he is in talks with Allawi’s Iraqiya.
The trouble for Maliki’s Dawa party allies is that he is the politician who won the most votes in the March 7 election, and most Dawa lawmakers owe their parliamentary seats to his popularity. It would be embarrassing to betray him.
Yet, as time drags on, some Dawa insiders have begun to hint that their party’s fate has to take precedence over Maliki’s.
The alternative candidates mentioned are close confidants:
Ali al-Adeeb: The most senior of the Dawa alternatives, Adeeb does not owe his seat to Maliki, but his credentials are tainted by a widespread belief that he has Iranian nationality.
Haider al-Abadi: a senior Dawa member, Abadi is an urbane politician with broad respect but owes his seat to Maliki.
Hussain al-Shahristani: Oil Minister Shahristani is a former Dawa party member. His chances are limited because he is viewed as a technocrat and not a political leader.
Possible scenarios:
Perhaps as a result of the opposition to his ambitions within Shia ranks, Maliki has reached out to Iraqiya, fuelling speculation he might strike a deal with Allawi.
Maliki becomes prime minister, a Sunni member of Iraqiya gets the speaker’s post, and Allawi becomes head of the National Security Council with broad authority.
Maliki becomes prime minister, and Allawi president. This is hard to imagine. Sunnis say they would regard Allawi as an honorary Sunni as prime minister, but not if he is president. Kurds would likely object to this scenario as well.
Maliki becomes prime minister, and Iraqiya picks half the government. This scenario is possible, but it hinges on Sunni leaders within Iraqiya sacrificing Allawi or on Allawi sacrificing himself for the benefit of Iraqiya.
Iraqiya combined with Maliki’s State of Law would have 180seats in the 325-seat parliament.
An Iraqiya deal with INA, including ISCI and the Sadrists, would give the combined bloc 161.
Under this scenario ISCI would take the PM post and Iraqiya would take speaker and most key cabinet posts, particularly security. Few see this arrangement as workable.
Recently, reports have emerged of an offer that would divide government posts between ISCI, Sadrists, Iraqiya and the Kurds, pushing State of Law into opposition in parliament.
Vice President Joe Biden said on a visit to Baghdad that Washington had no preferred candidate. But US officials say the next government should include all political groups so that all communities feel they have stake in the future as U.S troops withdraw over the next 18 months, and stop fighting.
Sadrists
Privately, though, many U.S. officials would like to see a solution that excludes the Sadrists from government.
The Sadrists are fiercely opposed to the US presence, and might demand either a speedier pullout or guarantees US forces are not allowed to remain beyond their end-2011 withdrawal date.
They are also viewed as unpredictable and disruptive as legislators and administrators.
Oil majors investing in Iraq’s oilfields may also prefer this solution — the Sadrists are the main critics of contracts the companies signed with the outgoing government.
http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=255507
