Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Globalization of banking Industry ~ Restructuring of the Banking and Regulatory Committees ...

2009

Globalization of banking Industry ~ Restructuring of the Banking and Regulatory Committees ...

BASEL, SWITZERLAND - The power base of the world has shifted…it is no longer in London, New York City, Washington D. C., or Tokyo. Neither is it in Beijing or Moscow. It is Basel, Switzerland. In 1930, the Bank for International Settlements-BIS was set up as a result of the Young Plan which was named after the man who presided over the Allied Reparation Committee, Owen D Young.

Basel was chosen as its location because everyone could get on a train from anywhere in Europe to attend its meetings. When you walk out of the main train station, the BIS is within easy walking distance of one block. A modern 18 story high building belies the power it extends globally. There is nothing about the building that calls anyone’s attention to it other than the plaque near the glass front doors that basically says it is private property. The world’s power brokers walk to the BIS without fanfare and are set apart from the citizenry by their business suit and ID pass.

Yet within its walls the world’s monetary system is being designing and directed by many illuminated and brilliant people from inside and from without, those who visit regularly from all over the world include: central bank ministers, treasury secretaries, regulators, insurance supervisors, deposit insurers and accountants. Truly the BIS is all powerful. Dr. Carroll Quigley in his book, Tragedy and Hope, wrote that,

The powers of financial capitalism had another far reaching aim, nothing less than to create a world system of financial control in private hands able to dominate the political system of each country and the economy of the world as a whole. This system was to be controlled in a feudalistic fashion by the central banks of the world acting in concert, by secret agreement, arrived at in frequent meetings and conferences. The apex was to be the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland (pp. 324-25).

If this power was not evident before, it is in the process of becoming greater and more immense. While the BIS has always been the focal point of central bank activity globally, it now is finalizing the structure Dr. Quigley wrote about. Bi-monthly, the Group of Ten central bankers, along with those from majoring developing nations come together to discuss global monetary policy, among other things. Over the years it has expanded to the point that every aspect of banking, finance, insurance, deposit insurance, and regulation now constitute its core workings.

In the mid-1990s the word “globalization” came into our vocabularies as we were faced with naming the process whereby the barriers between the countries of the world started to fall. Beginning with the establishment of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in 1944, the financial barriers between countries fell; with the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, the political barriers fell; with the establishment of the World Trade Organization in 1994, the trade barriers fell; with the establishment of the International Criminal Court in 1998, the legal barriers fell; and with the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, the military and intelligence barriers fell.

Similarly, during the 1990s, the Bank for International Settlements started to set up its own level of globalization. In1998, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors was set up and is comprised of insurance supervisors from all over the world. In 1999, the Financial Stability Forum was set up which was comprised of the Group of Seven treasury secretaries, central bankers, and regulatory agencies. Recently this organization was expanded to include the Group of Twenty. Then in 2002 the International Association of Deposit Insurers was set up. This organization is comprised of the “FDICs” of the world. Another organization which was set up in 1973 and then reconfigured in 1984 is the International Organization of Security Commissions-IOSCO which is basically a global “security and exchange” commission which has facilitated a global stock exchange.

What the 2008 Credit Crisis has provided is an opportunity to further enhance and empower these organizations which will and are in the process of transferring respective responsibilities from the national level to the global level, thus completing the process of banking, insurance, auditing, accounting, and regulatory globalization. It should be mentioned that in order for the United States to play its role in this process, the Obama Administration will have to set up a single national regulator over our seven different regulators that currently work independently. This is so important a step that the Financial Times recently ran an editorial on June 20 that warned America,

The need for thorough regulatory reform is still pressing. One concern stands out: the risk of the whole financial system breaking down, as it did last autumn. Those who want to give central banks the power and responsibility to monitor systemic risks are right. They include the US Treasury, whose proposals this week seek to turn the Federal Reserve into a systemic super-regulator. These proposals are contested. They should not be; the alternatives are worse. Reforms to rein in systemic risk must not now fall prey to politics. They must be enacted before the memory of last autumn fades.

Let us examine what the first paragraph of the Bank for International Settlements 79th Annual Report stated with regard to the credit crisis:

How could this happen? No one thought that the financial system could collapse. Sufficient safeguards were in place. There was a safety net: central banks that would lend when needed, deposit insurance and investor protections that freed individuals from worrying about the security of their wealth, regulators and supervisors to watch over individual institutions and keep managers and owners from taking on too much risk. Since August 2007, the financial system has experienced a sequence of critical failures.

While it provides their assessment of what went wrong, the report summarizes the problem and the solution this way:

In summary, financial regulators, fiscal authorities, and central bankers face enormous risks. Building a perfect, fail-safe financial system—one capable of maintaining its normal state of operations in the event of a failure—is impossible. Standing in the way are both innovation and the limits of human understanding, especially regarding the complexity of the decentralized financial world. We have no choice but to take up the challenge of first repairing and then reforming the international financial system.

Their recommendations include the BIS standard-setting committees (the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the Central Bank Governance Forum, the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems, and the Markets Committee) and the Financial Stability Board. For our purposes we will discuss the newly centralized power of the Financial Stability Board.

First it should be noted that with this kind of total economic and monetary failure, the entire system should be scrapped and perhaps we should go back to being individual nation-states, but you see for their purposes, they are expanding and empowering another level of control which will move the assets of the entire world into their domain. No physical war, no guns, no bullets—electronic financial warfare.

The Financial Stability Board was originally the Financial Stability Forum-FSF. When it was set up in 1999, I interviewed its Secretary-General, Svein Andresen who told me that there was no guarantee that it would be able to protect the global system from problems. However, it was believed that if you brought the central bank ministers together with the treasury secretaries and the regulatory agencies from the Group of Seven countries that it would provide a framework to protect the global financial system. Obviously they failed in their mission. The alternative instead of liquidating the FSF was to expand and empower it. When I asked FSB Chairman Mario Draghi about the role and input of the international bankers like Sir Evelyn de Rothschild, he replied,

We are in contact with various --say bankers association, market association—banks, hedge funds, securities fora and lots of other bodies. We look at what they do and then we make up our own mind. So it is an interesting context but in the end, ours is a forum where you have the regulators—banking regulators, market regulators, financial ministries and international organization and institutions and standard setters. So it is our own mind in the end which we look at.

It is important to note that the internationalization or globalization of the financial system is here. It constitutes tearing down the final barrier between the countries of the world. It has been almost fully operational for at least 10 years. At this point in the game, the integration between a handful of international organizations is apparent.

The need to coordinate international accounting through the International Accounting Standards Board with the American counterpart, Financial Accounting Standards Board- FASB with the FSB and G20 is already happening. IOSCO is working with the BIS Joint Forum and FSB. In order to develop high quality international standards for auditing, assurance, ethics and education for professional accountants, the Monitoring Group was set up and a Charter was put in place in 2008 by Memorandum of Understanding. Those participating include: IOSCO, the Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, the European Commission, the International Association of Insurance Supervisors, the World Bank, the Financial Stability Board and the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators.

Concentrating Total Financial Power at the Bank For International Settlements and the Financial Stability Board

There are those who have been predicting a time when there would appear a world government structure. That time is here. Many, however, have predicted that it would be political in power. That is not necessarily so. Although the United Nations has been an organizing power worldwide to harmonize national law with international law, they do not issue or print money—for that is the role of central banks. With the new and vast empowerments being given to the central banks of the world and with the restructuring of the Financial Stability Board, it appears that world government is financial and economic. The old adage is true, “He who owns the gold makes the rules.”

The entire banking system of the world, with the exception of a few Muslim countries, is run by private corporations called “central banks.” America’s central bank, the Federal Reserve, was founded in 1913. People should understand that it is not Congress which runs America but the Federal Reserve because without the money and credit that it provides to banks and subsequently home owners, farmers, and businesses, would not be able to function. All one has to do is study the various past economic crises to know that they occurred when the national banking system cut off credit. There is no doubt that the 2008 Credit Crisis has helped everyone to see that it is the banks—primarily the international banks and the central banks which run the world. While the names of the shareholders of the Federal Reserve remain secret, many people believe that the large international banks are some of its owners.

As a result of the Credit Crisis, the Bush Administration proposed the “Blueprint for a Modernized Financial Regulatory Structure” which was approved by current Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner who then was president of the New York Federal. He is now proposing the Obama regulatory blueprint. Recently released, it calls for many of the same recommendations as the previous blueprint, which can be summarized as a total centralization of power:

• A New Financial Services Oversight Council of financial regulators to identify emerging systemic risks and improve interagency cooperation.
• New authority for the Federal Reserve to supervise all firms that could pose a threat to the financial stability, even those that do not own banks.
• Stronger capital and other prudential standards for all financial firms, and even higher standards for large, interconnected firms.
• A new National Bank Supervisor to supervise all federally chartered banks (and other financial institutions currently not under Federal Reserve oversight).
• Elimination of the federal thrift charter and other loopholes that allowed some depository institutions to avoid bank holding company regulation by the Federal Reserve.
• The registration of advisors of hedge funds and other private pools of Capital with the SEC.

Since most are not acquainted with our financial and regulatory structure, they will not appreciate the incredible transfer of power being given to the Federal Reserve, a private corporation. Once Congress passes the necessary law, the Fed will be given massive powers over the entire financial and economic industry, the insurance industry, non-banking institutions as well as the mortgage industry.

While most Americans are hardly aware of the United Nations or World Bank, let alone the World Health Organization, it will be difficult to understand the two-pronged frontal attack: changing U.S. regulatory laws to correspond to global regulatory laws which are in the process of being strengthened and re-configured. The complexity is enormous and the areas affected are hardly known or at this time or truly understood. Sadly, Congress is so busy adjusting their togas, they do not understand that they no longer have the real power as it was given to the Federal Reserve in 1913.

A very major piece of the new international architecture is the newly configured Financial Stability Board-FSB. At the spring meeting of the IMF/World Bank, NWV had asked former BIS Managing Director, Sir Andrew Crockett, now with JP Morgan, what the role, power and function would be of the FSB. He explained that while the chairs were still being arranged at the table, that it would act at the global level to oversee national stability risks, it would work with other regulators, it would review standards set by various board on the national level, and it would employ a ‘college of regulators’ that would define methodologies. At the inaugural meeting held on June 26-27 in Basel, FSB Chairman Mario Draghi, Governor of the Bank of Italy, provided a detailed report on its new structure. He explained,

The FSB’s mandate is to assess vulnerabilities affecting the financial system; identify and oversee action needed to address them; promote coordination and information exchange among authorities responsible for financial stability; monitor and advise on market developments and their implications for regulatory policy; advise on and monitor best practice in meeting regulatory standards; undertake joint strategic reviews on the policy development work of the international standards setting bodies; set guidelines for and support the establishment of supervisory colleges; manage contingency planning for cross-broader crisis management; and collaborate with the IMF to conduct Early Warning Exercises.

The FSB was given an official “plenary” structure which would be like the structure of any other international body, like the plenary of the United Nations. It will be comprised of G20 central bank ministers, treasury secretaries, and regulatory authorities. It will have a Steering Committee and three Standing Committees: for Vulnerabilities Assessment; Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation; and Standards Implementation.

The Standing Committee for Supervisory and Regulatory Cooperation will address coordination issues that arise among supervisors and regulators and set guidelines for and oversee the establishment and effective functioning of supervisory colleges.

A number of questions have been raised with regard to the college of supervisors which will be a key component of the FSB. In April, 2008, the G7 welcomed the idea of the college of supervisors to make the world’s financial markets less risky. Paulson’s blueprint and his recommendation to bring all of the different U.S. regulatory bodies under one agency is key to making the supervisory colleges work. Many on the international level wanted to be the one responsible for suggesting it, Gordon Brown of the UK being one of them. The supervisory college would monitor the world’s top 30 financial firms in order to have “effective cross-border supervision.” This would be formally agreed to by Memorandum of Understanding which would describe how it will function, be organized and coordinate between supervisors, banks, and countries.

The FSB will be comprised of the Group of Seven plus: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, Hong Kong SAR, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Spain, Switzerland, and Turkey. In addition the European Central Bank and the European Commission, as well a host of international financial institutions and international standard setting, regulatory and supervisory groups with participate.

The above constitutes a total restructuring of the entire financial system, mortgage system, insurance industry, non-banking institutions, and any other entity connected with money on a worldwide basis. While the central banks control the monetary system, they are now being given complete centralization of these financial powers. Congress can argue about whether or not they will put all of our regulatory agencies under one roof, but the real truth is that they don’t have the power to do that for “he who owns the gold makes the rules.” The Federal Reserve, along with Treasury has already been playing a major role to help set in place the new financial and regulatory infrastructure.

In short, what comes after this will probably be a global currency that will lead to a time of total control under a cashless system. The BIS would not answer NewsWithViews' questions about a change to the Special Drawing Right from the dollar. BIS Managing Director Jaime Caruana commented, “Repairing the financial system and building a more resilient one for the future also requires broad-based efforts involving cooperation between government and the private sector. At the same time, we need to resist the move towards protectionism; mounting that resistance puts a premium on international cooperation and a heightened sense of shared responsibility.”

link

JUNE 30TH 2009 DECLARED A HOLIDAY IN IRAQ ...

Sunday, June 28, 2009

JUNE 30TH 2009 DECLARED A HOLIDAY IN IRAQ ...

Iraq regains control of cities as U.S. pulls back
Iraq regained full control of its towns and cities on Tuesday, declaring the day a national holiday for Iraqis to celebrate the withdrawal of U.S. troops, six years after invading to topple Saddam Hussein.

Though some Iraqis fear the first step of a full U.S. withdrawal leaves them open to attack, the government declared "National Sovereignty Day" a holiday and held a military parade to flex its muscles at a still stubborn insurgency.

"This day, which we consider a national celebration, is an achievement made by all Iraqis," Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said in a televised address, as citizens drove around the streets in celebration.

link ~
JUNE 30TH 2009 DECLARED A HOLIDAY IN IRAQ ...

Enormous changes are imminent...Message by Saul

June 28 2009

Enormous changes are essential and imminent

Humanity’s continuing rise in frequency or spiritual evolvement is truly glorious to see. Great progress is constantly being made as more and more of you experience insights, moments of spiritual awareness and recognition that harmonious loving acceptance of one another leads to unexpectedly serendipitous results.

God’s divine plan is unfolding most wondrously throughout all of His creation, and the results of the continuous infinite outpouring of His unconditional love onto your beautiful planet are quite amazing to behold.

The groundswell of spiritual energy that the prayer and meditation so many of you are doing is creating a symphony of grace and healing that is affecting every aspect of planetary life and bringing into the conscious awareness of more and more of you a very perceptible sense of your divine heritage. It is an awakening realization that “of course God exists and that He is infinitely loving and caring”, and people are wondering what is causing this knowingness to seep into their reality and enticing them to pay attention to it. They find it increasingly difficult to ignore.
As they pay attention, they start to seek further information from friends, books, and the World Wide Web and are frequently surprised and relieved to discover how much information is available, and to find themselves resonating with it.


Many of their repressed fears and anxieties about life and its possible meaning are coming to the surface of their conscious everyday awareness and demanding attention. They are beginning to seek spiritual guidance and answers to the many questions that are slipping, apparently unbidden, into their minds.

The unsatisfactory way in which governments operate and betray the trust invested in them is becoming more and more apparent, and the groundswell of anger and dissatisfaction that this awakening has unleashed is growing rapidly.

A sense that enormous changes are essential and imminent is being felt right across the planet, throughout every culture, nation, and ethnic group. And this feeling will be increasingly validated as major changes start to occur and become apparent all over planet Earth.

You are all set for a great and thrilling ride as change after change flows across the planet, offering the most startling and exciting possibilities for renewal and realignment of your ways of living and interacting with each other and your whole worldly environment.

The culmination of this stage of God’s divine plan is almost upon you and is bringing with it a new and beautiful age in which peace, harmony, and joyful and exhilarating cooperation will change forever the way you perceive yourselves, your environment, and the infinite divine creation that is All That Is.

With so very much love, Saul.



Monday, June 29, 2009

BIS MEETING - CHINA - BRAZIL TRADE DEALS

June 29, 2009, 6.57 am (Singapore time)

China, Brazil working on trade FX deal: central banks

* China, Brazil want trade deals done in local currencies* Other central bankers question dollar's global role

BASEL - China and Brazil are working on a currency arrangement to allow exporters and importers to settle deals in their local currencies, bypassing the US dollar, the countries' central banks said on Sunday.

Speaking on the sidelines of the Bank for International Settlement's (BIS) annual general meeting in the Swiss city of Basel, other central bankers questioned the dollar's future role as the world's dominant reserve currency.

China's Central Bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan and Brazil's Central Bank President Henrique Meirelles discussed the bilateral deal in a meeting at the BIS on Saturday.

'It is agreed in principle,' a spokesman for the Brazilian central bank told Reuters. 'They will start to study this.'

No details were available on the size of the arrangement or the timeline for finalising details.
Alternative to dollarThe debate of an alternative international currency to the dollar has heated up in recent months after the world's key reserve holders in emerging economies have expressed concern about the US dollar remaining the dominant reserve currency.


As emerging nations gain more clout in the global economy, they also want to study how they might increase the use of local currencies in international trade.

China - the world's top holder of foreign exchange reserves - renewed its call on Friday for the creation of a super-sovereign reserve currency to reduce the dollar's global domination, which it said had worsened the financial crisis.

Russia, whose reserves are the world's third largest, has also called for the world to become less dependent on the dollar.

'You have China, Russia proposing we should think about a more international reserve currency other than the dollar,' Jassem Al-Mannai, director general, Arab Monetary Fund said in a Reuters interview. 'America, through this crisis, accumulated huge debts. It's a heavy burden on the dollar.'

Argentina's central bank Governor Martin Redrado told Reuters that the dollar will have to share the global stage with strong regional currencies such as the Chinese yuan and Brazilian real in the future.

'The yuan will have a role in Asia with the yen; obviously the euro; in South America probably the real .. so we are looking at a world in which the dollar will continue to be the leading currency, but it will be a much more shared approach,' he said.

Philippine central bank Governor Amando Tetangco also told Reuters in Basel that the recent trend of diversification away from the dollar is set to continue.

'(For) emerging central banks to shift out of the US dollar, it has been always an option and this has happened to some extent in the form of diversification into foreign currencies ... This process will inevitably continue,' he said.

Yuan's internationalisationMr Zhou said a further step was for Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Chinese President Hu Jintao to discuss the arrangement, which he said would not necessarily involve a currency swap like those China has in place with other countries.

'What we are discussing is that Brazil's president Mr Lula and our president Mr Hu talk about the possibility and gradual development to use our local currency for some trade settlement and ... investment, that's the major thing,' he told reporters.

'It's not necessarily to use a currency swap.' The People's Bank of China (PBOC) has arranged six bilateral currency swaps, totalling 650 billion yuan (US$95.12 billion), since December with countries including Malaysia, Argentina and Hong Kong.

Under the arrangements, a central bank on the other side of the swap will be able to lend the yuan provided by the PBOC to domestic commercial entities to pay for imports.

Chinese exporters are thus paid in their home currency, eliminating exchange rate risks and reducing the cost of fund transfers. The same applies in the other direction of the swap.

Brazil is not afraid of slowly diversifying out of US dollars in its investments and international trade, as long as the process is safe and not an 'adventure', Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said on Friday.

-- REUTERS

http://www.businesstimes.com.sg/sub/latest/story/0,4574,339626,00.html?

BASEL, SWITZERLAND MEETING ON ECONOMY

Recovery frail but stimulus exit must be timely

2009/06/29 at 10:08 am EDT

BASEL, Switzerland, June 29, 2009 (Reuters) — Unprecedented attempts to stimulate economic growth may fail to bring a sustained recovery, yet withdrawing them too late could be even more risky, leading central bankers said on Monday.

Regional currencies would gain in importance, they also said after two days of talks. But the
U.S. dollar still had no serious rival in playing a lead role in foreign reserves and trade settlement, according to the monetary policy chiefs from the world's major industrial and emerging economies.

The
Bank for International Settlements warned that although authorities had tried to arrest sharp declines in economic output, it was still an open question whether the stimulus would lead to a sustained recovery.

Still, waiting too long to withdraw support could fuel inflation and create new imbalances, the BIS, which acts as a forum for the world's central banks, said in its annual report.

"It may be too early to take exit strategies now; we don't think it's too early to talk about them," BIS general manager
Jaime Caruana told Reuters Television after the bank's annual meeting.

Although it was risky to wait too long, "experience suggests that the bigger risk is exiting too late and too slowly or, in the case of fiscal policy, not exiting at all," he said after the meeting at the BIS headquarters in the Swiss city of Basel.

As the financial crisis has deepened, central banks around the world have slashed interest rates and poured extra liquidity into markets, some by buying assets directly.

Governments have rushed to help banks and promised extra public spending this year worth about 2 percent of economic output of the Group of 20 nations, according to the
International Monetary Fund.

Central bank chiefs attending the meeting, including European Central Bank President Jean-Claude Trichet, U.S.
Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke and Bank of Japan Governor Masaahi Shirakawa, believe that eventually ending the very expansionary policies will be a major challenge.

Mexico's Guillermo Ortiz told Reuters that it may be premature to detail exit strategies as yet. Amando Tetangco of the Philippines said central banks could refrain from raising interest rates, warning that exit strategies should avoid disorderly adjustment.

ONLY TEMPORARY HELP

The BIS said governments may not have acted quickly enough to remove problem assets from the balance sheets of key banks, instead focusing on guarantees and capital -- also exposing taxpayers to potentially large losses.

Past experience showed that the key to recovery was to force the banking system to take losses, dispose of non-performing assets, eliminate excess capacity and build their capital base.

"These conditions are not being met. A significant risk is therefore that the current stimulus will lead only to a temporary pickup in growth, followed by protracted stagnation," the BIS said in the annual report.

"The lack of progress threatens to prolong the crisis and delay the recovery because a dysfunctional financial system reduces the ability of monetary and fiscal actions to stimulate the economy."

The BIS, which has long warned of the dangers of asset price rises, said the crisis also showed central banks must take a more activist stance on asset and credit booms, leaning against the wind rather than mopping up the damage afterwards.

"The financial crisis has shown that it is ultimately too costly for central bankers to focus narrowly on inflation," it said, noting that this preoccupation may have led some to make policy mistakes.

"With the benefit of hindsight, one can see that policymakers underappreciated the extent of the slowdown in mid-2008 and the strength of the associated disinflationary forces," the BIS said.
DOLLAR

Debate on an alternative reserve currency to the dollar also featured at the BIS annual meeting, after
China and Russia had expressed concerns in recent months.

However,
United Arab Emirates central bank governor Sultan Nasser al-Suweidi told Reuters that a global reserve currency other than the dollar was difficult to contemplate and plans to use a new currency would not succeed.

Malaysia's central bank governor Zeti Akhtar Aziz said Asia had not reached the stage yet of developing financial markets that would allow the internationalization of the local currencies, and the dollar still played an important role.

China and
Brazil said on Sunday the two countries are working on an arrangement to allow exporters and importers to settle deals in their local currencies, bypassing the dollar.

Jassem al-Mannai, head of the Arab Monetary Fund, said on Sunday that the huge U.S. debt and moves by Russia and China to start considering another reserve unit could drag on the dollar.


http://www.newsdaily.com/stories/tre55s36q-us-bis-economy/

Sunday, June 28, 2009

GCC SEEKS STRONGER ASEAN TRADE TIES ...


Bahrain seeks stronger GCC-Asean trade ties

Gulf Daily News - 29 June, 2009

Foreign Minister Shaikh Khalid bin Ahmed Al Khalifa yesterday called for stronger and balanced economic relations between the GCC and the Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean).

He was speaking on the eve of the first GCC-Asean preparatory meetings, which open today ahead of ministerial meeting scheduled for tomorrow.

The preparatory meetings and the First GCC-Asean Ministerial Meeting are being held at the Ritz-Carlton Bahrain, Hotel and Spa. An official dinner for all participating delegates will be hosted by Prime Minister Shaikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa at the same venue this evening. His Majesty King Hamad will host a luncheon at Gudaibiya Palace tomorrow, followed by the signing of a memorandum of understanding between GCC and Asean secretariats.

Thai Foreign Affairs Minister Kasit Piromya is among those attending the events."There are huge economic and investment opportunities that promise substantial dividends for the blocs," he told Bahrain News Agency, stressing the need to intensify such gatherings and discuss economic issues in particular.

"The deep changes sweeping the world economies have set aside old certainties and prompted us to seek partnerships with greater political and economic blocs," he said. Announcing the framework agreement, he said the deal would be a real catalyst to set up joint investment ventures and achieve sustained development in the Gulf and the South East Asian regions.

He singled out the banking, agriculture and trade as key sectors involving promising opportunities for co-operation. He stressed the growing political and economic clout of the Asean countries which represent a massive market for
GCC oil, aluminum and petrochemical exports.

He also expressed optimism, saying that the Bahrain meeting would herald comprehensive co-operation and bigger trade exchanges."Bahrain hosts this key meeting, conscious of the challenges facing the world as a result of the global meltdown," he said. Asean was formed on December 12, 2005 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. It includes Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Indonesia and Brunei.

The Asean represents a political, economic and demographic power to reckon with in a globalised economy, representing a huge market with a population exceeding half a billion, 10 per cent of the world population.

The Asean group is set to gain more leverage as Japan, China and South Korean prepare to join in as part of the project ASEAN + 3. Meanwhile, the GCC sits on oil reserves averaging 474bn barrels, 47pc of the world reserves.

PROMISE TO REMOVE ITEM V11 FROM IRAQ

Political first: the promise of removing Iraq from the international agenda item VII

Saturday, June 27, 2009

Security Council discusses the issue at a meeting a few days

BAGHDAD - Al Sabah

Four states, including three permanent members of the UN Security Council, and the promises of the new Iraq, removing it from the money item VII. Revealed that the "morning," Sami al-Askari, deputy member of the Foreign Relations Committee in the House of Representatives

And the military that the next few days will witness an important meeting to discuss the UN Security Council's commitment to Baghdad to carry out its obligations in accordance with the resolutions imposed on Iraq by the Saddam regime's invasion of Kuwait.

It should be noted that a Western diplomat had revealed the "morning," Recently, the UN Security Council's lifting of a number of UN resolutions imposed on Iraq during the two meetings will be held this month, and expected of the UN resolution would keep Iraq under Chapter VII, but the bases and new mechanisms to enable then to get rid once and for all of these sanctions, with the write-off of two or more, among the six international resolutions and the remaining restrictions on Iraq.

The military said that Iraq had fruitful talks with Turkish officials, and French, British, American, pointing out that these officials have promised to make efforts to bring the wrath of the country the seventh item, as authoritatively stated in resolution 1859 adopted on December 22 of last year, which calls for a review of the decisions adopted by the Security Council since 1990.

The continuation of Kuwait moves to prevent the country out of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, despite Iraq's compliance with all international resolutions.'s crisis has erupted between the two countries recently, following the movements of the civilian adviser to the Kuwaiti Amiri Diwan Mohammad Abdullah Abu Hassan, the members of the Security Council to prevent the lifting of international sanctions on Iraq, which is unacceptable, several deputies, asking to pay compensation to Kuwait due to Iraq's past policies and the confiscation of tens of kilometers of the country's territory, while the Republic and called on President Jalal Talabani and Minister Nuri al-Maliki called for a solution files outstanding with Kuwait through bilateral dialogue, the latter refused to do so.

The issues of compensation and the remains of the Kuwaiti border and the demarcation of the main points of contention between Iraq and Kuwait. He stressed the need for military support from the international community of Iraq, especially that the country will see on Tuesday is a national benefit, and the withdrawal of foreign forces from Iraqi cities and towns in accordance with the signed security agreement between Baghdad and Washington, the end of last year .

It was Iraq's ambassador to the UN, Hamid al-Bayati said in a speech to the UN Security Council recently, said that "things have changed in Iraq no longer poses a threat to the world, especially the proximity", and expressed his hope that "a formal recognition of this through out the provisions of Chapter VII of the and assist the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Security Council of Iraq to return to his international stature as it was before Saddam's invasion of Kuwait.

JUNE 30TH 2009 DECLARED A HOLIDAY IN IRAQ ...

He added that "on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from cities on the end of the month in which the historical significance of a large deserves to be a national holiday," he said, adding that "next Monday will be great activities and events in Baghdad and across Iraq and to mark the celebration of the restoration of sovereignty to Iraq on its own."

JUNE 28, 2009

Maliki in parliament, to confirm the ability to maintain the security file Always disabled on the occasion of the official withdrawal and directed to amend the law with the Washington Convention.

الصباح BAGHDAD - Al Sabah

Parliamentary sources suggested the presence of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, commander-in-chief of the armed forces to the House of Representatives in the coming days to confirm the government's ability to manage file security after the withdrawal of foreign troops.


These leaks and simultaneous with the decision of the Council of Ministers always disable the official on Tuesday, June 30 to mark the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the cities, and the orientation of the Parliament to amend the Referendum Act of a security treaty with Washington as a prelude to postpone it.

A member of the security and defense committee in Parliament MP Abbas al-Bayati, of the "morning": that the Prime Minister may visit the House of Representatives in the next few days, to give congratulations to the Congress and presents the capabilities of the government and security forces the security file on the maintenance of stability and to sustain in the country.

He added that "on the withdrawal of U.S. troops from cities on the end of the month in which the historical significance of a large deserves to be a national holiday," he said, adding that "next Monday will be great activities and events in Baghdad and across Iraq and to mark the celebration of the restoration of sovereignty to Iraq on its own."

Under the security agreement signed between Iraq and the United States late last year, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from cities and towns by the thirtieth of this month, to be a full withdrawal from the country end of the year 2011.

The government had decided to disrupt the office hours of the day Tuesday, June 30 to mark the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the cities, to continue the examinations for students in grades ending time, and the central celebrations of the day before the deadline. تفاصيل صOn the other hand, stressed member of the Security and Defense Committee that "the amendment of the law on security agreement with Washington and the promise of a referendum for an item is essential, because all the indicators and stresses the difficulty of the conditions to hold a referendum next month by the Independent Electoral Commission, especially with the elections of the territory concerned Kurdistan, in addition to the need for a period ranging from 3 to 6 months to complete the substantive and technical preparations for the referendum.

He noted that "the postponement of the referendum was not linked to the purpose of political, but technical difficulties caused by lack of time and therefore delayed the need for an amendment to the bill on the ratification of the Convention, especially given that the Constitution does not provide for a referendum on the conventions, but on the ratification of the conventions of Parliament", and revealed the existence of " political consensus on the amendment of the Convention on the withdrawal, despite the fact that parliament was not received until now on a government request to postpone the referendum.
____________

Tuesday, June 30, 2009

Iraq regains control of cities as U.S. pulls back
Iraq regained full control of its towns and cities on Tuesday, declaring the day a national holiday for Iraqis to celebrate the withdrawal of U.S. troops, six years after invading to topple Saddam Hussein.

Though some Iraqis fear the first step of a full U.S. withdrawal leaves them open to attack, the government declared "National Sovereignty Day" a holiday and held a military parade to flex its muscles at a still stubborn insurgency.

"This day, which we consider a national celebration, is an achievement made by all Iraqis," Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki said in a televised address, as citizens drove around the streets in celebration.

"Our incomplete sovereignty and the presence of foreign troops is the most serious legacy we have inherited (from Saddam). Those who think that Iraqis are unable to defend their country are committing a fatal mistake."

In another sign of what he called the start of a new era, the Oil Ministry held an auction for eight oil and gas fields -- Iraq's first major investment by multinationals that were ushered out nearly 40 years ago under nationalization.

But there was a bloody reminder of the war unleashed by the 2003 U.S. invasion as the U.S. military said four U.S. soldiers based in Baghdad had died of combat-related injuries on Monday. It gave no further details.

SECURITY PACT

By midnight on Tuesday, all U.S. combat units must have left Iraq's urban centers and redeployed to rural bases, according to a bilateral security pact that requires all U.S. troops except for trainers and advisers to leave Iraq by the end of 2011.

The day's festivities included a parade in Baghdad's heavily fortified Green Zone government and diplomatic district, viewed by Iraqis as the ultimate symbol of the foreign military presence until local forces took control of it in January.

Thousands of Iraqi soldiers and police paraded on foot or in U.S.-donated Humvees, armored cars and tanks -- in the same compound, beside a monument to the Unknown Soldier, where Saddam's forces used to stage elaborate displays of power.

The state television channel, Iraqiya, has been running a countdown clock in a corner of its screen.

And across Baghdad, signs were draped on the ubiquitous concrete blast walls reading "Iraq: my nation, my glory, my honor."

"We still have important steps to take and we know our way forward is not easy," Interior Minister Jawad al-Bolani told Reuters at the parade.

"We need to develop our intelligence gathering and technical abilities, because the next war is an intelligence war."

The commander of U.S. forces in Iraq, General Ray Odierno, confirmed U.S. combat troops were fully out of the cities.

"A small number of U.S. forces will remain in the cities to train, advise ... and enable Iraqi security forces," he told journalists in Baghdad, declining to give specific numbers.

OILFIELDS ON OFFER

At the nearby Rasheed Hotel, foreign oil executives gathered for the day-long oil and gas fields auction, eager to get a foothold in the country that has the world's third largest oil reserves.

But Iraq's ambitions soon hit commercial realities as it found that there was a big gulf between what it was willing to pay for the 20-year service contracts and the fees the companies were willing to accept.

A consortium led by the British-based BP accepted a contract to develop the biggest oilfield, the 17-billion barrel Rumaila in the south, but only after a group led by Exxon Mobil of the United States had rejected the government offer.

Iraq needs the expertise of the oil majors to restore its oil infrastructure, hit hard by sanctions and war.

But awards to U.S. and British firms could anger opponents of the invasion, who have said the 2003 war was designed to give Western oil companies control over Iraqi oil reserves. U.S. and British officials have denied the accusations.

The tight security at the venue, and the presence of bodyguards with earpieces escorting the international energy executives, was a reminder of how unstable Iraq still is.

Some fear a resurgence of violence without the presence of U.S. forces to police Iraq's cities, although their bases outside remain close enough for them to redeploy if needed.

Militants have stepped up attacks in the past week, including two of the biggest bombings in more than a year, which killed 150 people between them.

But the tit-for-tat violence that brought Iraq to the brink of all-out sectarian civil war in 2006-2007 has receded.

In any case, Iraq has to take the plunge eventually, with President Barack Obama planning to end the U.S. combat mission by August 31 next year.

The political situation remains unsettled. Tensions have grown between Baghdad and the minority Kurds in Iraq's north, and all eyes will now be on a parliamentary election in January that will test Maliki and Iraq's fledgling democracy.

How To Get Rid Of Things ...

July 2009

Hound Dogs and Fleas

How Much Currency Does it take to Get Rid of IRRITATING Fleas on Hounds

Eucalyptus is effective in most dog flea control because fleas can't stand the smell of it. Be careful not to apply it directly to your dog, however, because it is strong and can be irritating. Instead, try mixing ten to fifteen drops of eucalyptus oil with water and use it as a spray on your dog's coat. You can also add the oil to the final rinse when washing your dog's bedding, place eucalyptus leaves under furniture or rugs and even try a eucalyptus wool wash when washing your dog. So many uses! I bet koalas don't have a flea problem. The cost is minimal. pay by credit card or "currency..newshound".

Symptoms of Fleas - CurrencyNewsHound fleas

1.excessive scratching/itching very irritating
2.biting or chewing, especially at the rear, tail and inside or outside of thighs
3.hair loss
4.skin lesions
5.red, raised bumps
6.flea dirt
7.personality changes

8.running in circles

http://www.getridofthings.com/get-rid-of-fleas-on-dogs.htm

Wednesday, June 24, 2009

JUNE 24-26 2009 - United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System ...

Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial System

UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE WORLD FINANCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON DEVELOPMENT

NEW YORK -- JUNE 24-26 2009

excerpt from th every long pdf file:

The Global Reserve System

2. Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and the suspension of the gold convertibility of the dollar, a system of flexible exchange rates among major currencies has predominated. Although alternative national and regional currencies (such as the euro)compete with each other as international reserve assets and means of international settlement, the dollar has maintained its predominant role in both regards, a predominance that became firmly established after the Second World War. In a significant sense, therefore, the post-Bretton Woods system has been a “fiduciary dollar standard”.

3. This system has proven to be unstable, incompatible with global full employment, and inequitable.

4. One of the main problems of the Bretton Woods system was identified by Robert Triffin in the 1950s: the use of a national currency (the US dollar) as the international reserve currency generated a difficult dilemma: dollar deficits were necessary to increase global liquidity, but at the same time eroded the confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency, which generated in particular increasing risks as to the capacity to maintain the dollar-gold parity. Although abandonment of dollar convertibility and flexible exchanges rates eliminated some of these problems, it created new ones. Instead of uncertainty over the ability to maintain the dollar gold parity, the “Triffin dilemma” is now associated with the large swings in the current account imbalances of the U.S. and associated volatility of the dollar exchange rate, and in
the long run with the risk of the loss in the value of foreign exchange reserves held in dollars as U.S. external deficits increase.

5. The instability and incapacity to guarantee full employment are also associated with the fact that, even after the introduction of flexible exchange rates, the system was unable to eliminate the deflationary (contractionary) bias associated with asymmetric adjustment to payments imbalances falling on deficit countries –the fact that deficit countries face stronger pressures to reduce their payments imbalances (the major exception being the reserve issuing country) than surplus countries face to correct theirs. Flexible exchange rates also introduced new forms of instability in a world of increasing free capital mobility: those associated with the volatility of capital flows, particularly but not only short-term flows.

6. Finally, the inequities are generated by the fact that, as a result of a sequence of severe crises, developing countries learnt that they need better instruments to protect themselves against global financial and economic instability. Coupled with the increasing unwillingness 93 of developing countries to submit to the conditionality associated with IMF support, this has led a massive accumulation of reserves over the past two decades. However, as these reserves are mostly held in hard currency, they also represent a transfer of resources to the United States and other industrialized countries.

7. Many believe that this problem could be eliminated by creating a supranational international reserve currency. Indeed, the idea of an international reserve currency issued by a supranational bank is not new. It was broached more than seventy five years ago by John Maynard Keynes in his 1930 Treatise on Money, and refined in his Bretton Woods proposals for an International Clearing Union. There currently exist a number of alternative proposals for a new global reserve currency, for how the system might be administered, how the emissions of the new currency might be allocated, and how the transition to the new system might be managed. Considerable international discussion will be required for the international community to decide the precise arrangements. However, this is an idea whose time has come. This is a feasible proposal and it is imperative that the international community begins working on the creation of such a new global reserve system. A failure to do so will jeopardize prospects for a stable international financial system, which is necessary to support a return to robust and stable growth.

Instability

8. The current international system is marred by a number of sources of instability. One of the major problems, as noted, is that as holdings of the reserve currency accumulate over time, confidence in its value as a store of value is likely to wane. After abandonment of fixed exchange rates in the early 1970s, the main manifestation of the creation of excess dollar liquidity was a tendency for the U.S. dollar to depreciate. When the U.S. responds with action to reduce its external deficit, in part to restore the credibility of its reserve currency status, this generates dollar appreciation accompanied by contractionary pressure on the world economy. Irrespective of the phases of the global cycle of liquidity demand, U.S. monetary policies are implemented with little consideration of their international impact and are thus a potential cause of instability in exchange rates and global activity.

9. Since the 1960s, the system has indeed been plagued with cycles of confidence in the U.S. dollar. These cycles have become particularly intense since the 1980s, leading to unprecedented volatility both in the U.S. current account deficit and the effective exchange rate of the U.S. dollar. As a result, the major attribute of an international store of value and reserve asset, a stable external value, has been eroded. There is another sense in which the current system is unstable.

10. By definition, for the world economy, the sum of all deficit countries’ balance of payments must equal the sum of all other countries’ surpluses. But the way surplus and deficits are brought into equality is not necessarily smooth and will usually involve changes in incomes of individual countries. If a large number of countries choose policies aimed at increasing their trade surpluses, or if international institutions encourage deficit countries to improve their balance of payments, the deficits of the remaining country or countries will become increasingly large. With the dollar as the major international reserve currency, unless the U.S. is willing to be the “deficit country of last resort”, the adjustment will take place through a decline in global income. In turn, if the U.S. macroeconomic policies are overtly 94 expansionary, unless other countries accept balance of payment surpluses the adjustment will take place through expanding global income and inflation. In both cases, the result is likely to be growing global imbalances, exchange rate instability and the erosion in confidence in the dollar as a reserve currency.

11. The introduction of flexible exchange rates in the presence of growing private international capital flows failed to meet the expectations that adjustment of balance of payments would become smoother while leaving each country the necessary autonomy to guarantee their domestic macroeconomic policy objectives. The basic reason is that countries can avoid adjustment as long as they can attract sufficient external flows. When these prove to be insufficient to cover funding for the imbalance or are reversed because of lack of confidence, the adjustment takes the form of a financial crisis. The asymmetry remains, but the negative impact on the deficit country is much greater, as the continued financial crises since the mid-1970s has made clear. Self-insurance and Deflationary Bias of the Global Reserve System

12. Global imbalances, associated in part to the way different countries reacted to the financial instability of the late 1990s and early 2000s, played an important role in the macroeconomic conditions leading to the current world financial crisis. The asymmetric adjustments to these global imbalances in their turn played a part in generating the insufficiency of global aggregate demand that has converted a U.S. financial disruption into a global economic recession. Unless both problems are remedied, it will be difficult to restore the economy to robust, stable growth.

13. These difficulties in the design of the international financial system led to large accumulations of reserves by developing countries in recent years, and especially after the Asian and Russian crises of 1997-1998. These crises, as those that preceded it in the late 1970s and early 1980s, showed that developing and emerging countries are subject to strong pro-cyclical capital flows. If authorities react by allowing capital surges during booms to generate rapid exchange rate appreciation and the build up of current account deficits, the outcome is almost certainly a twin balance of payments and domestic financial crisis later on. This problem is particularly acute when the boom is in the form of short-term, largely speculative capital flows, a point that came to be increasingly recognized after the Asian crisis. The decision to build stronger current account positions and to accumulate large foreign exchange reserves in the face of booming capital inflows in 2004-2007 were therefore a common response of these countries to create policy space to respond to the negative impact of the expected recurrence of crises. Similarly, commodity exporting countries have experienced in the past repeated crises, when sharp improvements in the terms of trade are accompanied by unsustainable demand booms and by exchange rate appreciation that generate “Dutch disease” effects. More generally, since the Asian crisis developing and emerging market countries have found it increasingly attractive to save that part of exceptional export proceeds that were considered to be temporary. High commodity prices in the years preceding the current crisis exacerbated the problems that this posed for global balances.

14. These policies could be considered as a form of “self-insurance” or “self-protection” against capital reversals, adverse movements in the terms of trade and excessive exchange 95 rate volatility associated with financial crises. The fact that the only available “collective insurance”, in the form of IMF financial assistance, is highly conditional and often imposes pro-cyclical policies during crises, reinforced the view that self-protection in the form of reserve accumulation was a better strategy.

15. As a result of these factors reserve accumulations rose to 11.7% of world GDP in 2007 vs. 5.6% a decade earlier, at the time the Asian crisis struck. Reserve accumulations in the period 2003-2007, in the run up to the crisis, amounted to an annual average of $777 billion a year or 1.6% of global GDP. The major concern is that if the current crisis is as long and as deep as feared, and if the assistance provided to developing countries is inadequate, there will be attempts to preserve strong external balances through protectionist measures, beggar thy-neighbour exchange rate policies, and stronger “self-insurance” through reserve accumulation all measures that will impede a rapid response to the crisis.

16. When reserve accumulation is the result of current account surpluses and not only of the attempt to offset private autonomous foreign capital inflows, there is a reduction in global aggregate demand.3 In the past, the negative impact on global aggregate demand of these reserve accumulations was offset by other countries running policies that resulted in large current account deficits, particularly loose monetary and fiscal policies in the United States. But such policies, as already argued above in Chapter 2, have been the source of global instability.

17. The question posed by the autonomous reduction in the US deficit is: what will now sustain global aggregate demand? It is unlikely to be another American bubble leading to another period of large and unsustainable American deficits and the continuation of global imbalances. Such a course risks a repeat of the current crisis. Thus, something has to be done about the underlying sources of the insufficiency of global aggregate demand.

18. A global reserve currency whose creation was not linked to the external position of a national economy could provide a better system to manage the deflationary bias that the system faces during crisis, as well as the broader problems of instability analyzed above. It would be possible to regulate the creation of global liquidity, and reduce the ability of a reserve currency country to create excessive liquidity. And the system can be designed in ways to put pressure on countries to reduce their surplus and thus reduce their contribution to the insufficiency of global aggregate demand. This would contribute to the reduction of global imbalances.

2 There may be other reasons, such as the need to provide for an aging population that would lead countries to adopt policies to increase domestic savings and hold them in the form of foreign assets. The associated “imbalances” would then simply reflect differences in the propensities of different countries to save and invest.

This has led to the general idea that financial flows would be from developed with high saving aging populations to developing countries with younger populations and higher returns on investment. However, this has not been verified in the statistics on international capital flows. Restrictions on the ability to use industrial policies to encourage nascent industries in emerging countries (as many of the currently industrialized countries did in their earlier phases of development) under recent WTO agreements may have led some countries to substitute exchange rate policies to effect similar outcomes, and this too may have contributed to reserve accumulations.

3 These reserves are sometimes called “owned reserves” to differentiate them from “borrowed reserves”, when their counterpart are capital inflows.

19. Other innovations to improve risk sharing mechanisms would reduce the demand for reserve accumulations, and therefore reduce the magnitude of the requisite emissions (see below).

Inequities

20. The current system is also inequitable because it results in developing countries transferring resources to the industrial countries that issue the reserve currencies. In particular, the build up of dollar reserves represents lending to the United States at very low interest rates. This transfer has increased through time due to the realization by developing countries that large foreign exchange reserves are their only defence in a world of acute financial and terms of trade instability.

21. Developing countries are, in effect, lending to developed countries large amounts at low interest rates. In 2007, the last year for which data was available, it amounted to $3.7 trillion.

The difference between the lending rate and the interest rate which these countries pay to developed countries when they borrow from them is a transfer of resources to the reserve currency countries that exceeds in value the foreign assistance that developing countries receive from the developed countries. The fact that developing countries choose to hold such reserves provides testimony to their perception of the costs of instability, of the adjustment costs that they would have to bear if they did not have these reserves. Cost to the reserve currency country.

22. The United States also incurs costs associated with its role as supplying global reserves. The demand for global reserves has led to increasing current account deficits in the United States that have had adverse effects on U.S. domestic demand; when dollars are held to meet increased demands for liquidity in surplus countries, they fail to produce any countervailing adjustment in foreign demand. In addition, periodic needs to correct these deficits require contractionary monetary or fiscal policies that have adverse domestic effects on the U.S. economy.

23. Countries holding substantial dollar reserves have started to call for a constraint on U.S. policies that might cause depreciation in the international value of the dollar and thus a decline in the value of their reserve holdings. China, as the major holder of dollar reserves, has already noted the risks to its dollar reserves should the US adopt policies leading to a depreciation of the dollar. The only way to respond to this call would mean for the U.S. a loss of policy autonomy as it would have to take the effects on the rest of the world in designing its monetary policy. Maintaining autonomy to U.S. policy, as it would be required to respond the current crisis, would be the basic advantage for the U.S. to move to a global reserve system, beyond the benefits it would receive from a more stable global financial and economic system. A two (or multiple) reserve currency system may be worse than a single reserve currency

24. It should be emphasized that a system based on multiple, competing reserve currencies would not solve the inequities of the current system, as reserve assets would still be provided 97 by industrial countries. It would also add an additional element of instability to a purely dollar-based system, associated with the exchange rate volatility among the currencies used as reserve currencies. Indeed, this problem is already present in the current system. Such volatility results in major gains and losses by Central Banks on their reserve holdings, a feature that increases the risk associated with holding specific reserve assets and, therefore, undermines their value as what they are meant to be: low-risk assets.

25. The basic advantage of a multi-polar reserve world is, of course, that it would provide room for diversification. However, if Central Banks and private agents were to respond to exchange rate fluctuations by changing the composition of their international assets, this would feed into exchange rate instability. Under these conditions, a multiple currency reserve system would generate growing calls for a fixed exchange rate arrangement, but fixing the exchange rates among major currencies in a world of free capital mobility would be a daunting task. It would also require policy coordination and loss of monetary sovereignty that seems unlikely under current political conditions.

Call for a Global Reserve Currency

26. These long standing deficiencies in current arrangements have become manifest in the lead up to the current global financial crisis, and can make it deeper. If countries choose increased protection in the form of higher domestic saving and accumulation of reserves as a response to the uncertainty of global market conditions, this would lead to further deepening of the aggregate demand problems that the world economy is facing. The increases in the U.S. national debt and the balance sheet of the U.S. Federal Reserve have led to concerns in some quarters about the stability of the dollar as a store of value. The low (near zero) return on holdings of dollars means that they are receiving virtually no return in exchange for the foreign exchange rate risk which they bear.

27. These are among the reasons that it is desirable to adopt a truly global reserve currency. Such a global reserve system can also reduce global risks since confidence in and stability of the reserve currency would not depend on the vagaries of the economics and politics of a single country.

28. The current crisis provides, in turn, an ideal opportunity to overcome the political resistance to a new global monetary system. It has brought home problems posed by global imbalances, international instability, and the current insufficiency of global aggregate demand. A global reserve system is a critical step in addressing these problems, in ensuring that as the global economy recovers it moves onto a path of strong growth without setting the stage for another crisis in the future. It is also a propitious moment because the United States may find its reserve currency status increasingly costly. Moreover, the US has embarked on a response to the crisis that will involve large domestic and also potentially large external imbalances, with unpredictable implications for the international reserve system.

Thus, both the United States and foreign exchange reserve holding countries may actually find it acceptable to move in the direction of a new system. The former would be able to take policy decisions with less concern about their global impact; the latter would be less concerned about the impact of US policies on their reserve
holdings.

Institutional frameworks for a new global reserve system

29. In setting up such a system, a number of details need to be worked out. Among these are, who would issue the reserve currency, in what amounts, to whom would they be issued, and under what conditions. The issues are largely separable.

30. The responsibility for managing the global reserve system could be given to the IMF, which currently issues the only global currency, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), on which the system could be built, but it could also be given to a new institution, such as a “Global Reserve Bank”. If an existing institution is chosen, this should not inhibit asking more fundamental questions about the necessary reform of its structure in support of the global monetary system.

31. One possible approach would require countries to agree to exchange their own currencies for the new currency –say International Currency Certificates (ICC), which could be SDRs—and vice-versa in much the same way as IMF quotas are made up today (except that developing countries would only contribute their own national currencies, not the proportion of IMF quotas in convertible currencies). This proposal would be equivalent to a system of worldwide “swaps” among Central Banks. The global currency would thus be fully backed by a basket of the currencies of all members.

32. In an alternative approach, the international agency in charge of creating global reserves would simply issue the global currency, allocating ICC to the member countries, much as the IMF Special Drawing Rights are issued today. There would be no “backing” for the global currency, except the commitment of Central Banks to accept it in exchange for their own currencies. This is what would give the ICC (or SDRs) the character of an international reserve currency, the same way acceptance by citizens of payments in a national currency gives it the character of the domestic money. However, if the issues of global currency received by countries are considered deposits in the IMF or the Global Reserve Bank, and the institution in charge of managing the system is allowed to buy the government bonds of member countries or lend to them, then those investments would be the “backing” of the global currency just as domestic moneys are “backed” today by the assets of national Central Banks (the government bonds in their hands and their lending to private sector financial institutions).

33. Under any of these schemes, countries could agree to hold a certain fraction of their reserves in the global currency. The global reserve currency could also pay interest, at a rate attractive enough to induce its use as an investment for Central Bank reserves. Exchange rates would be managed according to the rules that each country chooses, subject to the condition that exchange rate management does not affect other countries –a rule that is already included in the IMF Articles of Agreement and must be subject to appropriate surveillance. As with SDRs, the exchange rate of the global currency would be the weighted average of a basket of convertible currencies, the composition of which would have to be agreed.

34. In the alternative in which the global currency is considered to be a deposit in the IMF or Global Reserve Bank, earnings by these institutions’ investments (lending to countries undergoing balance of payments crises, or otherwise in Treasury securities of member countries) would finance the interest paid to those countries that hold deposits of the global currency (possibly in excess of the original issues they received). Obviously the major advantage to holding the global currency is that the diversification away from individual currencies would generate more stability in the value of reserve holdings.

35. The global currency could be allocated to countries on the basis of some formula (“quota”), based on their weight in the world economy (GDP) or their needs (some estimation of the demand for reserves). Since developing countries hold reserves which are, in proportion to their GDP, several times those of industrial countries 26.4% of GDP in 2007 vs. 4.8% for high-income OECD countries), to manage the trade and capital account volatility they face, a formula that would allocate the currency according to some definition of demand for reserves would result in larger proportional allocations to these countries. One possibility is, of course, to give developing countries all allocations. Note that the current SDR allocation is based on a particular “quota” system, that of the IMF, which continue to be subject to heated debate because richer countries on average get a larger share of new allocations–i.e., the opposite to what a criteria based on need would indicate.

36. The allocation can and should have built into it incentives and/or penalties against maintaining surpluses. Countries that maintained surpluses would lose all or part of their quota allocation if they are not utilized in a timely manner to increase global demand.

37. The size of the annual emissions should be targeted to offset the increase in (nonborrowed) reserves, i.e. reductions in global purchasing power resulting from reserve accumulations. Simpler versions of this proposal would have annual emissions fixed at a given rate of say $150 to $300 billion a year (the first figure corresponds to the world demand for reserves in 1998-2002 but the demand for reserves was much larger in 2003-2007, indicating that even $300 billion a year might be insufficient).

38. More sophisticated and elaborate versions of this proposal would have emissions adjusted in a countercyclical way—larger emissions when global growth is below potential. It might be easier to get global consensus on either of these simpler variants, but more detailed versions would be able to support a variety of global needs (e.g. generate badly needed revenues for development or global public goods).

39. One institutional way of establishing a new global reserve system is simply a broadening of existing SDR arrangements, making their issuance automatic and regular. Doing so could be viewed simply as completing the process that was begun in the 1960s, when SDRs were created. The simplest version, as noted, is an annual issuance equivalent to the estimated additional demand for foreign exchange reserves due to the growth of the world economy. But they could be issued in a counter-cyclical fashion, therefore concentrating the issuance during crisis periods. One of the advantages of using SDRs in such a counter-cyclical fashion is that it would provide a mechanism for the IMF to play a more active role during crises.

40. Still another mechanism to manage SDRs in a counter-cyclical way was suggested by IMF economist Jacques Polak three decades ago: providing all financing during crises with SDR loans. This would generate emissions that would be automatically extinguished once loans are paid back and create the global equivalent to what the Central Banks of industrial countries have been doing on a massive scale during recent months.

41. Indeed, a large counter-cyclical issue of SDRs is the best mechanism to finance world liquidity and official support to developing countries during the current crisis. This was recognized by the G-20 in its decision to issue the equivalent of $250 billion in SDRs. However, this decision also illustrates the problems associated to tying SDRs issuance to IMF quotas, as somewhat less than $100 billion of the proposed emissions would benefit developing countries. This implies that this issue is closely tied to the ongoing debate about reform of IMF quotas. None of the proposed reforms to quotas deals adequately with the issue of equity, and indicates that different rules may have to be applied to quotas and SDR issues, as indicated above.

42. Although developing countries would only receive part of the allocations, the capacity of the Fund to lend would be considerably enhanced if the current system was reformed in such a way as unutilized SDRs, particularly from industrial countries, could be used by the IMF to lend to member countries in need –such as the proposal of treating unused SDRs as deposits in the IMF. However, unless there are strong reforms in the Fund’s practices, the ability of the emissions to address the liquidity and macroeconomic management problems noted earlier might be impaired, as developing countries might be reluctant to turn to the IMF for funds. Reforms in that direction were adopted in March 2009 with the creation of the Flexible Credit Line with only ex-ante conditionality, the doubling of all credit lines and the elimination of structural benchmarks in conditional IMF lending. But additional reforms to make access less onerous will be needed.

43. A simple way to further the use of SDR allocations to advance developmental objectives (which might require changing the Articles of Agreement) would be for the International Monetary and Finance Committee and the IMF Board to allow the IMF to invest some of the funds made available through issuance of SDRs in bonds issued by multilateral development banks. This would be similar to the proposal for a “development link” made by the UNCTAD panel of experts in the 1960s (see below).

44. Thus, a well designed global currency system would go a long way to correct the “Triffin dilemma” and the tendency of the current system to generate large global imbalances and the deflationary biases that are characteristic of balance of payments adjustments during crises. Depending on the way emissions are allocated, the system could also correct the inequities associated with the large demand for reserves by developing countries, and provide collective insurance against future shocks. If emissions were issued in a countercyclical way, they could perform an even more important role in stabilization. Historical antecedents

45. When Keynes revised his idea of a global currency in his proposal for an International Clearing Union, as part of the preparations for what became the Bretton Woods Conference, his major concern was the elimination of asymmetric adjustment between deficit and surplus countries leading to the tendency towards deficiency of global aggregate demand and a constraint on the policy space needed for policies in support of full employment. He also had in mind the significant payments imbalances that would characterize the post-war order and therefore the need to provide a better source of liquidity, both globally and for countries that would leave the war with structural payments deficits. Of course, the first of these problems, the asymmetric adjustment, was not corrected by the Bretton Woods system, and the second was only partly corrected.

46. In turn, when Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) were created in the 1960s, the major concern was how to provide a more reliable source of global liquidity to replace gold and reserve currency holdings (mainly dollars, but also British pound sterling at the time). It was believed that the existing sources of international liquidity were not reliable, as they depended in the first case on gold production and in the second on deficits of the reserve currency countries, particularly the United States. As the initial problems of global liquidity – the “dollar shortage”—were overcome, the attention shifted to risks of excessive dollar liquidity and, particularly, that the U.S. gold reserves would not be sufficient to support dollar-gold convertibility. This finally generated the demise of the Bretton Woods “dollar exchange standard” and the adoption of flexible exchange rates among major currencies.

47. At the time SDRs were created, it was hoped that they would become a major component of global reserves, thus creating a system in which the growth of global liquidity would depend on deliberate international decisions. This expectation has not been fulfilled, as SDRs have been created only episodically and in a total of a little over 20 billion SDRs, which represent only a minimal fraction of current world reserves. The nature of the problems of provision of global liquidity was obviously transformed with development of the private financial markets in Euro dollars and other Euro currencies and the introduction of a flexible exchange rate system. These problems associated with the provision of global liquidity are less important today, except during extraordinary conjunctures such as those generated during the severe shortage of liquidity, such as those created by the global liquidity crisis in August 1998 and the world financial crisis since September 2008. But a major problem remains: dependence of global liquidity on the vagrancies of US macroeconomic policies and balance of payments imbalances, which can generate either excessive or limited world liquidity. The recurrent problem of developing country access to international liquidity is still an embedded feature of the system, as a result of the pro-cyclical capital flows. Therefore, although there are no longer risks of insufficient liquidity in the international system, there are problems associated with the control of global liquidity and significant equity issues in the access to such liquidity by developing countries.

48. In Keynes’s initial proposal for a post-war arrangement, there was no need to address the problem of equity in issuance since the creation of clearing credits was entirely endogenous. This question was also evaded in the initial issuances of SDRs, although some ideas were proposed at the time on how to tie the issuance of a global currency to development financing, particularly in the proposal made by an UNCTAD expert panel to link the question of liquidity provision for developed economies to the needs of developing economies for development financing. But, as already seen, equity issues cannot be ignored today, as the current system subjects developing countries to recurrent problems of illiquidity or induces them to accumulate large amounts of foreign exchange reserves.

Transition to the new system

49. The reform of the global reserve system could take place through a global agreement or through more evolutionary approaches, including those that could build on a series of regional initiatives.

50. If a large enough group of countries agreed to pool reserves in a system in which they agreed to create and hold a common reserve currency, which they would stand ready to exchange for their own currencies, a regional reserve system or even a system of near-global coverage could be established without the agreement of all countries. So long as the new currency is convertible into any hard currency that itself is convertible into other currencies, it could serve effectively as a reserve currency. The countries participating might also agree to reduce, over time, their holdings of other reserve currencies.

51. Membership in this new “Reserve Currency Association” could be open to all that subscribe to its Articles of Agreement. The advantages of participation are sufficiently great that it is likely to grow over time, embracing more countries, holding a greater fraction of their reserves in the new global reserve currency. Eventually even the United States would probably find it desirable to join. Thus, gradually, through a stable, evolutionary process, the new Global Reserve System may be created as an alternative to the current system. Of course, there is also a risk of adverse selection: as long as participation is voluntary, soft currency countries would be those more willing to participate, and convertible global currencies outside the scheme could remain as the preferred currencies.

52. Existing regional agreements might provide an alternative way of evolving towards a global reserve system. Regional mechanisms have the advantage of their own and can be based either on swap arrangements among Central Banks or on foreign exchange reserve pools. Given the reluctance of governments to give up control over their reserves, swap arrangements may be more acceptable. Reserve pools offer, however, other advantages, such as the possibility of allowing the reserve fund to borrow during periods of stress, and, as noted, to issue a currency or reserve asset that could be used at a regional or global level. In the 1980s, for example, the Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) was allowed to issue Andean pesos.4 This asset, which has never been used, was expected to be used in intraregional trade, with periodic clearing of those held by Central Banks. The Chiang Mai Initiative, created in 2000 by members of ASEAN, China, Japan and the Republic of Korea is another important example of regional cooperation.5 Were this initiative to evolve into a reserve fund, it could back the issuance of a regional asset that could actually be attractive to Central Banks in other parts of the world to hold as part of their reserve assets. However, if the Chiang Mai Initiative is to achieve the objectives set forth for a global reserve currency, and if it is to play a more effective role in stabilization, it would be necessary to eliminate the provision that, after a certain threshold of use of existing swap facilities, countries would have to be subject to IMF conditionality.

53. A common criticism of regional arrangements is that they are not effective in providing diversification against systemic crisis, given that regional members are more likely to be adversely affected at the same time. Although this implies that they are a complement and not a substitute for a global solution, the underlying analysis is imprecise. Although the 4 The Latin American Reserve Fund was created by the Andean countries in the 1978 and was then called the Andean Reserve Fund. Current members are Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

This initiative works as a system of bilateral swaps by member Central Banks, which are in the process of being arranged on a multilateral basis. The system has so far not been used. ASEAN has a swap arrangement of its own that has a longer history.

ability of regional arrangements to address external shocks depends on negative events not being correlated across participating countries, they could still be useful if shocks affect member countries with different intensities or with lags, since this would allow some countries to lend their reserves to those experiencing a more severe or earlier shock. Furthermore, lending at the onset of a liquidity squeeze could prevent a crisis in a given country from affecting other countries, thereby reducing the correlation produced by contagion. More generally, a country would benefits from the regional arrangement if the variability of the regional reserve pool is lower than that of its individual reserves, and if potential access to the pool reduces the possibility of attacks on individual members and therefore acts as a mechanism of collective insurance that is more powerful than selfinsurance.
Statistical analysis by the UN Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean provides supports for this approach, as it indicates that correlations of relevant macroeconomic variables among countries in the region may be lower than usually assumed.

54. Regional initiatives could become an embedded part of the global reserve system. Some have suggested that the reformed IMF should be a network of such regional reserve funds. Such a decentralized system would have many advantages, including the possibility of solving problems associated with crises in the smaller countries at the regional level. The system would also be attractive for medium and small-sized countries that could have a stronger voice at the regional level. One way to link regional and global arrangements would be to make contributions to regional arrangements one of the factors that could be taken into account in determining SDR allocations.

SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULT AND RESTRUCTURING

Inadequacies of the existing system (or “non-system”) to manage debt crises

55. Sovereign debt crises have been a major source of the difficulties faced by developing countries in achieving sustained growth and development at different times since the 1980s. Social costs of these crises have been extremely large, and included long periods of lost income and jobs, increased poverty and, in some cases, worsening income inequality. Given the instability of external capital flows, severe financial crises hit even countries that were judged by international opinion to have been soundly managed. In several cases, crises originated in the need for a government to take over the responsibility for servicing privatesector debts, of the banking system or key firms that were judged “too big to fail”, in a way not too different from how the US and other industrial country governments have done during in the current global crisis. In other cases, the inability of the Central Bank to provide foreign exchange for private external debt servicing has led to effective official responsibility for the debt. This “nationalization” of private sector external debts was indeed a feature of the Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s and has been quite common in developing country debt crises since then.

56. Not only are current “work-out” processes protracted and costly, often the debt writedowns have been insufficient to provide sustainability. The existence of debt overhangs depresses growth, contributes to poverty, and crowds out essential public services. Often, because write downs have been insufficient, they are soon followed by another crisis. And because of the adverse terms and high costs imposed by the work-out, developing countries are reluctant to default in a timely way, resulting in delays in dealing with the underlying problems.

57. Moreover, worries about a protracted crisis in one country having spill-overs for others has motivated massive bail-outs, contributing in turn to problems of moral hazard, enhancing the likelihood of future crises.

58. Whether owing to risky policies or the intensified economic fluctuations of liberalized financial environments, the existing system of protracted and creditor biased resolution of sovereign debt crises is not in the global public interest, and is far from the interest of the poor in the affected countries.

59. The existing “system” (or really “non-system”) arose as piecemeal and mostly ad hoc intergovernmental responses to sovereign debt crises as they occurred over the past halfcentury or so. The fact that, as noted, the solutions that the current system provides take time to be adopted and provide inadequate relief, implies that the system for addressing sovereign debtors is clearly inferior to that provided in many countries for corporations and sub-sovereign public entities by national bankruptcy regimes. The latter not only aim to find a quick and equitable solution, but also one that achieves nationally desired economic and social outcomes, particularly a ”fresh start” (or “clean slate”) when a bankrupt entity is reorganized. The sovereign system is plagued also by horizontal inequities. Official lenders have always complained that private creditors do not follow restructurings agreed in the Paris Club (and have been “free riders”), and the magnitude of debt rescheduling and relief accorded in individual cases has clearly depended on the weight and negotiating capacity of the debtor country.

60. The system for sovereign debtors has operated under the informal and imperfect coordination of the debtor and its creditors by the IMF, under the guidance of the G-7 major industrialized countries. The latter countries set the overall policy directions for the IMF and the other involved institutions, such as the Paris Club, where debts owed to governments are restructured. The system assumes a developing country government in debt distress will adopt an IMF-approved macroeconomic adjustment program, that the program will be effective, and that all the relevant classes of creditors (banks, bondholders and suppliers, government creditors and multilateral institutions) will cooperate in providing the overall amount of relief and financial support deemed necessary on the basis of the Fund documents. Often there is very little real debt relief, only a mere rescheduling of the obligations. And often the magnitude of relief is based on excessively optimistic growth projections–setting the stage for problems down the line.

61. These assumptions never fully held and what confidence there was in the system was severely affected by how the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative and the East Asian, Russian, Ecuadorian and Argentine crises were handled. The HIPC Initiative was initially judged insufficient to give the poorest countries a fresh start and, after almost a decade of long negotiations, it was supplemented in 2005 with the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative. Nevertheless, the HIPC initiative was represented the first comprehensive approach to the solution of the debt problem of poor developing countries. The initiative came along with a framework which placed poverty reduction strategies at the centre of development cooperation, based in part on a broad social dialogue including the participation of civil society.

62. In addition the non-HIPC renegotiations that took place after the East Asian crisis have been judged as unsatisfactory. Most single country “workouts” from debt crises in this period were under cooperative voluntary arrangements with the bondholders that did not reduce the level of debt. The transparency of some of these renegotiations processes – including the pressures exerted on debtor countries by other nations and IFIs has also been questioned.

63. Moreover, while creditors have a seat at the table, other claimants such as government retirees, for instance, which have been promised a particular level of pensions do not. Chapter 9 of the US bankruptcy code, which applies to municipalities and other subsovereign public entities, gives priority to these “public” claimants on government revenues. In contrast, international procedures seem to pay insufficient attention to their interests.

64. Finally, some critics of current practices suggest that they are unnecessarily onerous because they are designed to provide strong incentives for countries not to default on their obligations. Small and weak countries may be forced to pay the price for ensuring that the overall system exercises discipline on borrowers.

65. Argentine’s rapid growth after its 2001 default, in spite of the long delay in the final resolution, shows that eliminating debt overhang can provide conditions for rapid economic growth even in seemingly adverse conditions. Despite rapid growth, however, this country faced significant problem regaining access to private financial markets.

Call for an International Debt Restructuring Court

66. Some have argued that new debt restructuring procedures are not needed; all that is required are small reforms in debt contracts such as collective action clauses. But no country relies solely on collective action clauses for debt resolution, and there is no reason to believe that doing so for international debt would be sufficient. For instance, collective action clauses do not provide effective means of resolving conflicts among different classes of claimants.

67. It is easy to agree that the amount of debt relief accorded to different countries should depend on their circumstances. However, it is artificial to have one set of rules for determining that relief for selected developing countries, as was the case for the HIPCs and later the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative, and another for the rest of the world. Rather, a single statutory framework for debt relief is needed to ensure that creditors and the debtor restructure the debt so as to provide a fresh start, based on the country’s unique economic condition. The debt workout regime should be efficient, equitable, transparent and timely in handling debt problems ex post (as problems become apparent, and especially after default)while promoting efficiency ex ante (when the borrowing takes place).

68. A well-designed process should protect the rights of minority, as well as majority, creditors–as well as “public” claimants. It should give debtors the opportunity to call default through a structured process. The principles of human-centred development, of sustainability and of equity in the treatment of the debtor and its creditors, and among thecreditors, should apply equally to all sovereign debt crises resolved through the international system. As in national bankruptcy systems, principals should be encouraged to reach a workout on their own to the extent possible. But whether such an agreement can be reached, and the nature of the agreement, can be affected by the backdrop of the legal structures.

69. Achieving these objectives require a more structured framework for international cooperation in this area. For the same reason that governments adopt bankruptcy legislation and do not rely solely on voluntary processes for resolving corporate bankruptcies, an efficient sovereign system requires something more than a moral appeal to cooperation. This means the creation of a sovereign debt workout mechanism.

70. This entails the creation of an “International Debt Restructuring Court”, similar to national bankruptcy courts. This Court would ensure that agreed international principles regarding priority of claims, necessary overall write downs and the sharing of “haircuts” were followed. It could differentiate between distinct debt categories which might include government, government guaranteed and government acquired private debt so as to make transparent the actual effective liabilities of the sovereign. It could also determine what debts could be considered “odious”. And it would be able to grant potential private or public creditors authority to “debtor in possession” financing, as in corporate restructurings, National courts would have to recognize the legitimacy of the international court, and both creditors and debtors will therefore follow its rulings.

71. Once proceedings have started, the “Court” might act as a mediator, attempting to establish international norms for sovereign debt restructurings. With a view to realizing a comprehensive workout it would encourage the creditors to coordinate their positions within and across different classes of lenders, in the long run including the government creditors that operate today through the Paris Club as well as multilateral creditors. Were mediation to fail or become unduly lengthy, the Court should have the power to arbitrate. It might also work in cooperation with the IMF, the World Bank, or regional development banks, to help provide interim finance to maintain economic strength while negotiations take place. But such lending should not be a mechanism simply for bailing out creditors who failed to do due diligence in providing lending.

72. Beyond the problems of sovereign debt restructuring, there are also serious problems in managing cross-border private debt workouts, with conflicts between different jurisdictions and with concerns about “home” country bias. The International Debt Restructuring Court could extend its reach to consider bankruptcy cases involving parties in multiple jurisdictions.

73. In earlier discussions of sovereign debt restructuring mechanisms, it was presumed that the IMF, or a separate and newly established division of the IMF, would act as the bankruptcy court. However, while it may be desirable to institutionalize the sovereign debt restructuring mechanism under the umbrella of an international institution, the IMF in its current form is unlikely to be the appropriate institution, as it is also a creditor and subject to disproportionate influence by creditor countries. It is therefore unlikely to be seen as a “neutral” mediator. The arbitration process of the International Centre for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes (ICSID) within the World Bank has similarly failed to generate confidence from the developing countries as a fair arbitrator of investor-state disputes under bilateral investment agreements.

74. Any procedure must be based on widely shared principles and processes with political legitimacy. Agreed upon goals, such as that the work-out must be fair, transparent sustainable, and promote development, would boost its credibility with debtors. Indeed this should include all stakeholders, including creditors who would appreciate the reduction of uncertainty under clear rules of the game and the knowledge that any post-workout debt situation would have a larger chance of being sustainable. But translating these goals into agreed upon principles and procedures may be difficult, given the conflicts of interests.

75. There is nothing immutable in the current approach to resolving sovereign debt crises. It arose in the political and economic environment created after the Second World War, and the need to develop a better system remains on the international policy agenda. The international community needs to actively resume the effort to define the specific mechanism to institutionalize the principles advanced here. Foreign Debt Commission

76. The crisis also gives urgency to reform of institutional structures for debt relief as an increasing number of developing countries, especially the most vulnerable low-income countries, may face difficulties in meeting their external debt commitments. This crisis therefore gives urgency to these reforms. Unless these debts are managed better than they have been in the past, the consequences for developing countries, and especially the poor in these countries, can be serious.

77. Although, as argued above, there is a need for new procedures for restructuring sovereign debt, this reform will take time, as it would require a new international treaty. In the interim, something needs to be done to ensure that debts are better managed–and this may be true even in the long run. It is important to take actions to manage debt better, so that countries are not forced into default.

78. The United Nations should therefore set up a Foreign Debt Commission to consider external debt problems of developing countries and economies in transition. The commission, with balanced geographic representation and technical support from the Bretton Woods, regional and other financial institutions, would address these issues andprovide advice on ways to enhance external debt crisis prevention and resolution.6It would also examine existing and advise on the design of better debt sustainability frameworks for the international community to follow. It would help debt-distressed countries return to debt sustainability, extend Paris Club-plus type approaches to new official creditors, set up an interim mediation service, and craft on the basis of that experience more permanent debt mediation and arbitration mechanisms.

Innovative Risk Management Instruments

6 See United Nations, “Doha Declaration on Financing for Development: outcome document of the Follow-up International Conference on Financing for Development to Review the Implementation of the Monterrey Consensus” (A/CONF.212/L.1/Rev.1), Doha, Qatar, 29 November -2 December 2008, paragraph 67.

79. The volatility of private capital flows to developing countries has generated increasing demand for policies and instruments that would allow these countries to better manage and minimize the risks associated with increasing international financial integration and, in particular, to better distribute the risks associated with this integration among different market agents. As has been demonstrated during past and current crises, the pro-cyclical and herding behaviour of international capital flows tends to generate boom-bust cycles, which are particularly damaging for developing countries, and it also reduces the scope they have to undertake counter-cyclical macroeconomic policies. Moreover, many developing and emerging countries borrow short term, in hard currencies, forcing them to bear the risk of interest rate and exchange rate fluctuations. And finally, inadequate debt resolution mechanisms impose high costs on developing countries.

80. In light of this, there have been a variety of ideas and proposals for introduction of innovative financial instruments. The proposed instruments include tools that enable better management of risks arising from the business cycle and fluctuations in commodity prices, particularly GDP and commodity linked bonds and financial guarantees that have a counter cyclical element embedded in their structure. Promoting local currency bond markets has also been seen as a way to enhance financial development and reduce the currency mismatches that affect debt structures in developing countries.

81. GDP-linked bonds are conventional bonds that pay a low fixed coupon augmented by an additional payment linked by a pre-determined formula to debtor country’s GDP growth. This variable return structure links returns to the ability to service and thus reduces the likelihood of costly and disruptive defaults and debt crises. The reduction of a country’s debt service when the economy faces financing difficulties can also facilitate a more rapid recovery, as it allows higher public spending in difficult times. For investors GDP-linked bonds reduce the probability of default, and thus the costs of expensive renegotiation, and offer a valuable diversification opportunity. Returns should be higher than with conventional bonds.

82. Since private financial markets are unlikely to develop these instruments autonomously, because of the externalities associated with their introduction multilateral development banks should take an active role in their development. In particular, these institutions could have an active role as “market-makers”. The expertise developed by the World Bank as marketmaker for the sale of carbon credits under the Kyoto protocol provides a precedent for these activities. The World Bank and regional development banks could, for example, make loans whose servicing would be linked to GDP. The loans could then be sold to financial markets, either individually or grouped and securitized. Alternatively the World Bank or regional banks could buy GDP-linked bonds that developing countries would issue via private placements. The fact that major multilateral development banks became active in this
type of lending could, furthermore extend the benefits of adjusting debt service to growth variations

The introduction of these securities must overcome, however, some practical difficulties. One possible set of concerns is associated with lags in the provision and frequent revisions of GDP data, as well as over the quality of these estimates, but these issues should be easy to resolve through international standard setting and the provision of technical assistance. More important in this regard is how to manage concerns that have been raised about the liquidity of such instruments, especially when they are newly issued. Such concerns were similarly raised when inflation indexed bonds were first introduced, but they are now accepted worldwide. Governments and multilaterals might have to help create a deeper market to countries that do not have access to the private bond market. GDP-indexed securities are particularly appropriate for Islamic finance, as they can be made compatible with Sharia law which prohibits charging of interest.

83. There might also be alternative ways of ensuring flexible payment arrangements that would allow automatic adjustment for borrowers during bad times. For instance, one possibility is for coupon payments to remain fixed and the amortization schedule to be adjusted instead. Countries would postpone part or all of their debt payments during economic downturns; and they would then make up by pre-paying during economic upswings. A historical precedent was set by the United Kingdom when it borrowed from the United States in the 1940s. The Anglo American Financial Agreement was negotiated by John Maynard Keynes and included a “bisque clause” that provided a waiver of 2% interest payment in any year in which the United Kingdom foreign exchange income was not sufficient to meet its pre war level of imports, adjusted to current prices.

84. Commodity-linked bonds can also play a useful role in reducing country vulnerabilities. Examples of commodity-indexed bonds include oil-backed bonds, such as the Brady bonds with oil warrants that were first issued on behalf of the government of Mexico. In such instruments, the coupon or principal payments are linked to the price of a referenced commodity. Again, it might be desirable for international institutions to help create a market for such bonds.

85. However, the greater complexity of this instrument, in comparison with conventional bonds, and the commodity price risk that the investor faces, may make commodity-linked bonds expensive. Again, it might be desirable for international institutions to help create a market for such bonds. While they are likely to be less useful than GDP-indexed bonds for the growing number of developing countries that have a fairly diversified export structure and therefore lack a natural commodity price to link to bond payments, they have the decided advantage that the risk being “insured” through the bond is not one affected by the actions of the country (i.e. moral hazard is less of a problem.)

86. Another way of addressing the problems created by the inherent tendency of private flows to be pro-cyclical is for public institutions to issue guarantees that have countercyclical elements. For example, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and Export Credit Agencies (ECAs) could introduce an explicit counter-cyclical element in all the risk evaluations and the guarantees they issue for lending to developing countries. This requires MDBs and ECAs to assess risk for issuing guarantees with a long-term perspective. When banks or other lenders lowered their exposure to a country, MDBs or ECAs would increase their level of guarantees, if they considered that the country’s long-term fundamentals were basically sound. When matters were seen by private banks to improve, and their willingness to lend increased, MDBs or ECAs could reduce their exposure. Alternatively, there could be
special stand-alone guarantee mechanisms for trade and/or long-term credit, for example within multilateral or regional development banks, which had a strong explicit countercyclical element. This could be activated in periods of sharp decline in capital flows and its aim would be to try to catalyze private sector trade or long-term credits, especially for infrastructure.

87. Finally, a number of developing countries have encouraged development of domestic capital markets, and in particular local currency bond markets. These markets in fact boomed after the Asian crisis, multiplying fivefold between 1997 and 2007 for the twenty large and medium-sized emerging economies for which the Bank of International Settlements provide regular information. This trend can be seen as a response of emerging economies to the volatility and pro-cyclical bias of international capital flows and the volatility of exchange rates. It can be viewed as a means of creating a more stable source of local currency funding for both the public and private sectors, thereby mitigating the funding difficulties created by sudden stops in cross-border capital flows, reducing dependence on bank credit as a source of funding and, above all, lowering the risk of currency mismatches. For foreign investors, it could actually be attractive to form diversified portfolios of emerging market local currency debt issued by sovereign governments or developing country corporations, with a return-to-risk that competes favourably with other major capital market security indices.

88. Further development of these markets is desirable. First, developing countries bondmarkets are still largely dominated by relatively short-term issues and, therefore tend to correct currency mismatches but to increase maturity mismatches. Second, it has proved to be much easier to develop large and deep local markets for public sector than for corporate debt. As a result, large corporations continued to rely on external financing. To the extent that such external financing is shorter term than that many developing country governments are able to get in global debt markets, the overall debt structure of countries tends to become shorter term–and therefore riskier. Indeed, the rollover of external corporate debt is viewed as the major problem facing many emerging economies today. Third, many of these markets are not very liquid. This problem has actually become more acute during the recent market downswing. Fourth, although local bond issues did attract foreign investors, they were largely or at least partly lured by the generalized expectations of exchange rate appreciation that tended to prevail in many parts of the developing countries during the recent boom. As the world financial crisis hit, there were large outflows of these funds, and in this sense reliance on these short term portfolio flows did not correct but may have enhanced pro-cyclicality of financing, much as short-term external bank debt did during previous crises.

89. Therefore, although the development of local bond markets is a major advance in developing country financing since the Asian crisis, its promise remains a partly unfulfilled in terms of risk mitigation. It is important for developing country governments, with support from international organizations to correct some of the problems that have been evident and to continue investing in the development of deep and longer-term domestic bond markets.

Innovative Sources of Financing

90. For some time, the difficulty in meeting the UN official assistance target of 0.7per cent of Gross National Income of developed industrial countries as official development assistance, as well as the need for adequate funding for the provision of global and regional public goods (peace building, fighting global health pandemics, combating climate change and sustaining the global environment more generally) has generated proposals on how to guarantee a more reliable and stable source of financing for these objectives.

91. This debate has led to a heterogeneous family of initiatives. A distinguishing feature of developments in recent years is the fact that the old idea of innovative finance has lead to action, with the Joint Declaration of President Jacques Chirac, President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President Ricardo Lagos and United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Geneva on January 30, 2004 launching the “Action Against Hunger and Poverty” that in Paris, in 2006 providing the background work for the “Leading Group on Solidarity Levies". The Leading Group now involves close to 60 countries and major international organizations.

92. Some of the initiatives that have been proposed encompass “solidarity levies” or, more generally, taxation for global objectives. Some countries have already decreed solidarity levies on airline tickets but there is a larger set of proposals. There have also been suggestions to auction global natural resources–such as ocean fishing rights and pollution emission permits–for global environmental programs.

93. The receipts from these innovative initiatives could be directed to support developing countries to meet their development objectives, including their contribution to the supply of global public goods, as well as international organizations that are active in guaranteeing the provision of such goods. The existing taxes on airline tickets, for example, are being used to finance international programs to combat malaria, tuberculosis and HIV-AIDS.

94. The suggestion of taxes that could be earmarked for global objectives has a long history. To avert their being perceived as encroachments on participating countries’ fiscal sovereignty, it has been agreed that these taxes should be nationally imposed, but internationally coordinated. While universal participation is not indispensable, it would serve the interest of development, as more resources would be raised. Some suggestions aim at both raising funds for global objectives and mitigating a negative externality at the global. Two suggestions deserve special attention: a carbon tax and a levy on financial transactions.

95. Since carbon dioxide is the main contributor to global warming, a tax on its emissions can be defended on environmental efficiency grounds and would also have the advantage of correcting a negative externality in addition to being a significant source of development financing, which according to some estimates could reach as much as $130 billion per year. However, carbon taxes should not be implemented in both developed and developing countries. A uniform global carbon tax, even if introduced gradually, would mean that developing countries will be taxed at several times the rate for industrial countries, as a proportion of their respective GNPs. This would impose a disproportionate burden of adjustment on developing countries, although per capita emissions of greenhouse gases in developing countries are low compared with those in industrial countries. Carbon taxes will also have adverse distributional impacts in developing countries. A high tax on an essential good (e.g. energy, but also food or water) could render it unaffordable by lower income groups. This would not only be regressive, but would also be socially unacceptable and environmentally unpredictable.

96. An alternative to carbon taxes, which is now being used, is the auctioning emissions rights. Emissions trading is one of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and has been implemented by means of a European trading scheme which provides for an overall capping of emissions. The mechanism makes pollution with greenhouse gases costly for the emitter who has to acquire emission certificates. In this way, public revenues are generated which can be used to finance both mitigation and adaptation to climate change in developing countries, thus contributing to "climate justice".

97. Similar mechanisms can be designed to pay for environmental services. Such schemes are operational locally in different areas of the world. They allow for consumers of a given public good to compensate for some of the costs borne by those in charge of producing or preserving it. For instance, downstream users of water can pay those who manage the upstream forest to ensure a sustainable flow of this service into the future. It can be envisaged that similar instruments could pay for the provision of global environmental services, such as the preservation of rainforests.

98. Estimates of the revenues from a currency transaction tax range from $15 to $35 billion. However attractive the tax might be in terms of revenue potential, its implementation is constrained by a number of obstacles. Particularly, the tax base will have to be defined so as to exclude certain transactions that provide very short-term liquidity to markets (e.g., when this tax is applied at the national level, interbank lending is usually exempted) and special treatment for derivatives to avoid double taxation. It will also have to be protected from erosion, for even if all major financial centres participate, there is a risk that smaller centres will attract an increasing volume of activity from those wishing to evade the tax. Finally, strong opposition by a number of stakeholders would have to be overcome.

99. Alternatively, a levy on trade in shares, bonds and derivatives could be introduced. Implementation would be easier than in the case of a currency transaction tax, as a small number of participating countries suffices at the beginning. In later stages, over the counter and currency trading could be included. Large stock exchange centres exhibit positive agglomeration externalities; therefore a small tax would not lead to a flight of trade towards alternative, smaller exchanges.

100. Another set of proposals rely on the use of financing mechanisms. One mechanism that already has a long history of application is swaps of debt for development objectives. It has been recently used in the Debt 2Health initiative launched in Berlin in 2007, which converts portions of old debt claims on developing countries into new domestic resources for health. The International Finance Facility was proposed by the UK in 2003 to up-front commitments for future flows of ODA, by issuing bonds backed by public or private sector donors’ pledges. The first of these mechanisms, the International Finance Facility for Immunization, is already in place.

101. Public-private sector partnerships can also be used to guarantee certain international objectives. A mechanism of this type is the Advanced Market Commitments proposed by Italy, through which government donors commit funds to guarantee the price of vaccines once they have been developed, provided they meet a number of criteria on effectiveness, cost and availability. This helps encourage pharmaceutical firms to focus on research into neglected diseases which mainly affect poor countries.

102. Emphasis in innovative financing initiatives has also been given to illegal financial flows from developing countries, including those lost by developing countries through tax evasion and other illegal means. It has set up for that purpose a task force on Global Financial Integrity, under the direction of Norway. The importance of combating tax evasion has already been underscored in Chapter 3.

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